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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Daniel Allen Clark appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty
plea to possession of heroin. On appeal, Clark challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On May 2, 2017, police responded to a call about a disturbance at a Caldwell
address. (R., pp.32, 39, 41.) The reporting party informed dispatch that she heard a couple
arguing, and that it “sound[ed] like [the] male is breaking things.” (R., pp.32, 39.) The
call was cleared after the argument was determined to be verbal in nature. (Id.)
Two days later, on May 4, 2017, a reporting party informed dispatch that the
previous night, she heard, coming from the same address as associated with the May 2 call,
“loud noises and crying from female and baby.” 1 (R., p.32; Tr., p.4, Ls.16-25; p.39, Ls.415.) The reporting party further stated that when she woke up the next morning, there
were clothes, jewelry and other property scattered around the neighbor’s driveway. (Tr.,
p.4, Ls.20-23.) The reporting party was aware that the male in the residence had just gotten
out of jail, and that the female was pregnant. (R., p.41.) She expressed concern that the
woman inside the house may be injured. (Tr., p.4, Ls.23-25.) Officer Scott Crupper of the

1

At the hearing at the motion to suppress, Officer Crupper also described the reporting
party as reporting “a bunch of commotion and screaming from a woman” the previous
night. (Tr., p.4, Ls.16-20.) As Clark notes in his Appellant’s brief (Appellant’s brief, p.2
n.2), Officer Crupper also testified that the “CAD Call info/comments” section of his police
report did not include the term “screaming” (Tr., p.39, L.4-15; see also R., p.41).
1

Caldwell Police Department responded to the address provided by the reporting party. (Tr.,
p.3, Ls.11-15; p.5, Ls.1-3.)
Officer Crupper arrived at the residence and knocked loudly on the front door for
between one minute and one and a half minutes. (Tr., p.5, Ls.6-9; p.25, Ls.7-12.) He
received no response, and did not hear anything coming from inside the house. (Tr., p.5,
Ls.12-15.) He also observed a large number of personal items scattered on the driveway
behind a car – including jewelry. (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-5; p.19, Ls.8-13.) The items appeared to
Officer Crupper to have been “thrown” rather than simply dropped. (Tr., p.19, Ls.3-16;
p.24, L.6 – p.25, L.6.) Officer Crupper then walked towards the attached garage side of
the house, and opened the unlocked French doors to the garage. (Tr., p.5, L.18 – p.7, L.2;
p.9, Ls.10-12.)
Inside the garage, Officer Crupper observed a woman sleeping on a couch. (Tr.,
p.7, L.3-5.) He talked to the woman from the doorway. (Id.) The woman informed Officer
Crupper that there were people in the residence. (Tr., p.7, Ls.10-13.) Officer Crupper
asked the woman to retrieve them. (Id.) The woman attempted to do so, but reported to
Officer Crupper that the residents of the home were asleep and did not want to get up. (Tr.,
p.7, L.24 – p.8, L.13.) At some point, a second officer, Officer Hemmert, arrived at the
scene, and both officers entered the garage. (Tr., p.40, L.24 – p.41, L.13.)
As the officers entered the garage, they noticed an unsupervised approximately
two-year-old child standing in the open doorway between the attached garage and the
house. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-17; Exhibit 2, 0:40-1:20.) The woman informed the officers that the
child was not hers. (Exhibit 2, 0:40-0:45.) Due to concern for the residents based upon
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the reporting party’s call, and a concern for the welfare of the small child, the two officers
then entered the open doorway into the house. (Tr., p.10, L.12 – p.11, L.17.)
The officers followed the child to just outside the bedroom of the home’s residents.
(Tr., p.11, L.18 – p.12, L.5.) Officer Crupper called out to the individuals in the bedroom
and requested that they get dressed and come into the living room. (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-16.)
The individuals – Clark and another woman – did so. (Tr., p.12, L.20 – p.13, L.13.) Officer
Crupper observed that Clark and the other individual were groggy and may have been
under the influence of a controlled substance. (Tr., p.15, L.8 – p.16, L.12.) The individuals
would later both admit to having recently used heroin. (Tr., p.16, Ls.17-24.) Clark also
admitted that he was on parole. (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-6.)
The officers contacted Clark’s parole officer, who arrived at the residence. (Tr.,
p.17, Ls.3-10.) The parole officer searched the residence pursuant to Clark’s Fourth
Amendment waiver associated with his parole agreement. (Tr., p.17, L.11 – p.18, L.9.)
Based on the fruits of this search, the state charged Clark with heroin possession,
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and the persistent narcotics violator
sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.25-28.)
Clark filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the house. (R., pp.3069.) Filed in support of the motion to suppress were affidavits from Clark and his defense
attorney, the affidavit of probable cause, police reports from Officers Hemmert and
Crupper, 2 and a memorandum in support. (Id.) In the memorandum, Clark argued that the
officers’ warrantless entry into the garage and residence was unlawful; and that, even if the

2

The affidavits were bates stamped and attached to Clark’s counsel’s affidavit filed in
support of Clark’s motion to suppress. (See R., pp.30-50.)
3

initial entry was lawful, the officers should have left once they entered the garage (or in the
alternative, the house) after it became clear there was no imminent danger to the occupants
of the house. (R., pp.53-67.) In response, the state argued that the warrantless entry was
justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, and that additional
information obtained by the officers after they entered the garage justified further entry
into the house. (R., pp.70-81.)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to the admission of
Clark’s parole agreement and the footage from Officer Hemmert’s body camera. (Tr., p.2,
Ls.2-6.) Prior to the hearing, the state conceded that Clark had standing to challenge the
search of the residence. (Tr., p.1, L.18 – p.2, L.1.) Officer Crupper was the only witness
to testify at the hearing. (Tr., p.3, L.1 – p.41, L.17.)
After the hearing, the district court denied Clark’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.93101.) The court concluded that the officers’ warrantless entry into the home was justified
by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. (R., pp.96-100.) The court
further concluded that the officers’ search of Clark’s bedroom was lawful pursuant to the
consent contained in Clark’s parole agreement. (R., p.100.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Clark pled guilty to heroin possession,
the state agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor paraphernalia charge and the habitual narcotics
offender sentencing enhancement, the parties recommended that the heroin possession
sentence be run concurrent with another pending case, and the parties were otherwise free
to recommend any lawful sentence. (Tr., p.51, L.18 – p.58, L.10.) The district court
imposed a unified seven-year sentence with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp.136-137; Tr., p.60, L.4 – p.69, L.20.) Clark timely appealed. (R., pp.138-140.)

4

ISSUES
Clark states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Clark’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

By virtue of his unconditional guilty plea, has Clark waived the issue he
presents on appeal?

2.

Has Clark failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
By Virtue Of His Unconditional Guilty Plea, Clark Has Waived The Issue He Presents On
Appeal
A.

Introduction
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Clark pled guilty heroin possession, the

state agreed to dismiss a related misdemeanor charge and sentencing enhancement, and the
parties were free to recommend any lawful sentence. (Tr., p.51, L.18 – p.58, L.10.) Clark’s
guilty plea was not a conditional plea entered in compliance with the requirements of I.C.R.
11(a)(2). Therefore, with his unconditional guilty plea, Clark waived all nonjurisdictional
defects in the trial proceedings, including the issue he attempts to raise in this case. This
appeal should therefore be dismissed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation of court rules and statutes presents a question of law over which

appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d
1115, 1117 (2004); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 P.3d 998, 1001 (2010).

C.

Clark Did Not Enter A Conditional Guilty Plea Pursuant To I.C.R. 11(a)(2)
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute or rule will be interpreted

according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will not resort
to principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719,
721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996); see also
Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 217, 395 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2017) (“In the absence of a
statutory definition, the language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary
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meaning.” (quoting Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226, 231, 31 P.3d 248, 253 (2001)).
A guilty plea ordinarily constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects in the
trial proceedings. State v. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39, 936 P.2d 680, 682 (1997). Such
defects can be preserved for appellate review by entering a conditional guilty plea pursuant
to I.C.R. 11(a)(2). I.C.R. 11(a)(2) provides:
With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting
attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in
writing the right, on appeal from judgment, to review any specified adverse
ruling. If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant must be allowed
to withdraw defendant’s plea.
Therefore, in order to preserve a nonjurisdictional trial proceeding for appellate review
issue with a conditional guilty plea, a defendant must: (1) obtain the approval of the court;
(2) obtain the consent of the prosecuting attorney; (3) reserve in writing the right to appeal
from the judgment; and (4) specify an adverse ruling the defendant is preserving the right
to challenge on appeal.
A failure to comply with the requirements of I.C.R. 11(a)(2) results in waiver of
any issues not properly reserved for appellate review. See, e.g., State v. Book, 127 Idaho
352, 354, 900 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1995) (issue of validity of indictment was waived by
defendant’s guilty plea, where issue had not been reserved for review in writing); State v.
Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 889, 11 P.3d 1101, 1107 (2000) (issue of alleged mishandling of
evidence was waived by Hosey’s conditional guilty plea, where issue had not been reserved
for review in writing); State v. Salinas, 134 Idaho 362, 367, 2 P.3d 747, 752 (Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that an I.C.R. 11(a)(2) conditional guilty plea requires the consent of the
prosecutor, and that Salinas did not preserve his right to present a speedy trial issue on

7

direct appeal when the only adverse ruling he specified in his conditional guilty plea was
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress).
In this case, no written plea agreement was presented to the district court prior to
Clark’s change of plea hearing. At the change of plea hearing, Clark’s attorney recited the
terms of the plea agreement to the district court – Clark agreed to plead guilty to heroin
possession, the state agreed to dismiss a related misdemeanor paraphernalia charge and the
habitual narcotics offender sentencing enhancement, the parties would recommend that the
heroin possession sentence would run concurrent with another pending case, and
sentencing recommendations would otherwise be open. (Tr., p.51, L.18 – p.52, L.2.) At
no point during the change of plea hearing did either of the parties represent to the court
that Clark’s guilty plea was conditional. (See Tr., p.51, L.4 – p.59, L.5.)
During the change of plea hearing, Clark’s attorney informed the district court that
Clark had not filled out a Guilty Plea Advisory Form. 3 (Tr., p.52, L.25 – p.53, L.4.) The
court asked Clark’s counsel to have Clark complete the form between that date and the date
of sentencing. (Tr., p.55, Ls.8-11.) After the plea colloquy, the district court stated that it
was accepting Clark’s guilty plea, “conditioned on the later review of the Guilty Plea
Advisory Form that I assume will be prepared for review by the sentencing judge.” (Tr.,
p.58, Ls.4-10.)
On the same day as the sentencing hearing, Clark filed a Guilty Plea Advisory
Form. (R., pp.109-122.) Within this form, Clark checked the “Yes” line in response to the
question, “[i]s this a conditional guilty plea in which you are reserving your right to appeal

3

Pursuant to I.C.R. 11(e), a district court “may require the defendant to fill out and submit
the plea advisory form found in Appendix A [of the Idaho Criminal Rules].”
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any pre-trial issues?” (R., p.114.) Clark checked the “No” boxes in response to the
questions, “[h]ave you waived your right to appeal your judgment of conviction as part of
your plea agreement?” and “[h]ave you waived your right to appeal your sentence as a part
of your plea agreement?” (R., p.115 (emphasis omitted).) The form, and Clark’s answers
to the questions in the form, did not specify any trial issues (other than his sentence),
associated with the preservation of his appellate rights. (See R., pp.109-122.)
At the sentencing hearing, over which a different judge presided, no reference was
made by the district court or the parties to the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, the “conditional”
nature of the court’s acceptance of Clark’s guilty plea, or to the preservation of any of
Clark’s appellate rights. (See Tr., p.60, L.4 – p.70, L.2.)
Clark’s guilty plea was not conditional because he failed to comply with the
requirement of I.C.R. 11(a)(2). He therefore failed to preserve any nonjurisdictional issues
from the underlying proceeding, including any challenge to the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. Specifically, Clark did not obtain approval from the court, obtain the
consent of the prosecuting attorney, or specify an adverse ruling from which he was
preserving his right to challenge on appeal.
On appeal, Clark acknowledges that the guilty plea colloquy contained no reference
to his appellate rights. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) However, Clark appears to assert that his
answers to certain questions in the Guilty Plea Advisory Form (which he filed the same
day as the sentencing hearing), combined with the lack of any objection by the state to the
form, evidenced Clark’s entry of a conditional guilty plea which reserved his right to
challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (Id.) This is incorrect for
several reasons.

9

First, the sentencing hearing contains no reference to the Guilty Plea Advisory
Form or any preservation of Clark’s appellate rights. (See Tr., p.60, L.4 – p.70, L.2.)
Therefore, there is no indication in the record that the district court or the prosecutor were
even aware of Clark’s answers to the questions in the Advisory Form about the preservation
of his appellate rights – let alone that they approved and consented to a conditional guilty
plea. Because the form was not referenced at the sentencing hearing, it is not even clear
whether the form was filed before or after the hearing on December 14, 2017. Even
assuming that the form was filed prior to the hearing itself, the state asserts that a prosecutor
cannot be bound by a term of a plea agreement included in a Guilty Plea Advisory form
that is not referenced elsewhere in the criminal proceeding, particularly when the form is
not filed until the day of the sentencing hearing. Such a practice cannot satisfy the I.C.R.
11(a)(2) requirement that a conditional guilty plea be entered with the “consent of the
prosecuting attorney.”
Even assuming that Clark’s answers to questions in the advisory form evidenced a
term of the plea agreement that was, for whatever reason, not referenced elsewhere in the
proceeding, the information in the form still does not satisfy the I.C.R. 11(a)(2) requirement
that a conditional guilty plea specify an adverse ruling from which the defendant may
appeal. See Salinas, 134 Idaho at 367, 2 P.3d at 752. While in the Guilty Plea Advisory
Form, Clark checked the applicable “Yes” or “No” boxes referencing the preservation of
his appellate rights (R., pp.109-122), the only specified trial issue referenced by the
questions was Clark’s sentence (See R., pp.109-122). Neither the form, nor Clark’s
answers to the questions in the form, referenced his motion to suppress and the district
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court’s denial of that motion. (See id.) Therefore, Clark did not specify this adverse ruling,
as required by I.C.R. 11(a)(2) to challenge that ruling on appeal.
If there is no “writing” entered into between the parties to determine with specificity
what rights were reserved by the defendant (and assuming that the other requirements of
I.C.R. 11(a)(2) have been met), the Idaho appellate courts will still sustain an appeal under
I.C.R. 11(a)(2) if they can determine the terms of the agreement, the nature of the appeal,
and the right reserved for the appeal with specificity from the record as whole. State v.
Anderson, 129 Idaho 763, 764, 932 P.2d 886, 887 (1997). In Anderson, during the
sentencing hearing, there was a specific reference by Anderson’s counsel to the conditional
nature of Anderson’s guilty plea, and a specific identification of I.R.E. 404(b) issue that
Anderson was preserving for appeal. Id. at 765, 932 P.2d at 888. The Idaho Supreme Court
therefore considered the merits of Anderson’s appeal because it was “determinable with
specificity that the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel entered into an agreement to
recommend a sentence and to permit Anderson to plead guilty reserving the issue of
admissibility of evidence rejected by the trial court [pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b)].” Id.
Because, in the present case, no such reference to appellate preservation was made during
either the change of plea or sentencing hearing, this Court cannot make such a
determination regarding the terms of the agreement.
Clark’s guilty plea was not a conditional plea entered in compliance with the
requirements of I.C.R. 11(a)(2). Therefore, Clark waived all nonjurisdictional defects in
the trial proceedings, including the issue he attempts to raise in this case. This appeal
should therefore be dismissed.
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II.
Clark Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Order Denying His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Clark contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained from his residence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-18.) Specifically, Clark
contends that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement did not justify
Officer Crupper’s decision to open the door of the attached garage. (Id.) In the event that
this Court reaches the merits of this claim, application of the correct legal standards to the
relevant facts found by the district court demonstrates that the court did not err in denying
Clark’s motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the trial

court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises free review
of the trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards have been satisfied
in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 9495 (2009). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial
court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995).

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Clark’s Suppression Motion
“[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’

the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted). A warrant is not required where “the
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exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citations
and quotations omitted). “The reasonableness standard imposed by the Fourth Amendment
requires that the nature of the intrusion upon the individual’s privacy interest be balanced
against the public need and governmental interest promoted by the action taken.” State v.
Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 (2003) (citations omitted). “An action is
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of
mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.” Brigham City,
547 U.S. at 404 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (emphasis original,
brackets omitted)). “The officer’s subjective motive is irrelevant.” Id. (citation omitted).
Courts have repeatedly recognized that when members of law enforcement take
action consistent with their community caretaking function, such action is reasonable and
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 293, 62 P.3d at 217. The
community caretaking function involves the duty of the police to help individuals that
officers believe are in need of immediate assistance. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754,
947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citing In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401 (1988)).
“In analyzing community caretaking function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality
of the circumstances test.” Id. “The constitutional standard in community caretaking
function cases is whether intrusive action of police was reasonable in view of all
surrounding circumstances.” Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State v.
Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1995)) (brackets omitted).
The emergency aid doctrine allows law enforcement to make a warrantless entry
into a place protected by the Fourth Amendment when there is a “need to assist persons
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who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403
(citations omitted). “[T]he emergency aid doctrine [falls] within the community caretaking function exception.” Barrett, 138 Idaho at 295, 62 P.3d at 219. This doctrine has
been applied to cases involving warrantless entries into homes. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 292,
295, 62 P.3d at 216, 219 (explaining that Idaho “treats the emergency aid doctrine within
the community care-taking function exception”); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 925 P.2d
1131 (Ct. App. 1996) (need to prevent risk of violence to defendant’s girlfriend and child
justified warrantless entry into defendant’s residence as “exigent circumstances”).
On appeal in this case, Clark’s argument is more narrow than the one he presented
to the district court. In his motion to suppress, Clark argued that the officers’ warrantless
entry into the garage was unlawful, and that, even if the initial entry was lawful, the officers
should have left once they entered the garage (or in the alternative, left once they entered
the house) after it was clear there was no imminent danger to the occupants of the house.
(R., pp.53-67.) On appeal, Clark has focused his argument on Officer Crupper’s initial
entry – specifically, his decision to open the door of the garage attached to Clark’s
residence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-18.) As Clark correctly notes on appeal (Appellant’s
brief, p.15), the focused nature of this argument renders many of the facts presented to and
decided by the district court irrelevant. The only facts relevant to Officer Crupper’s
decision to open the garage door, and to the district court’s determination of whether this
decision was justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, are facts
known to Officer Crupper at the time he opened the garage door. Other facts found and
analyzed by the district court – including the presence of the unsupervised toddler and
Clark’s parole status, are not relevant to the limited question Clark raises on appeal.
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Likewise, other concepts addressed in the motion to suppress proceeding – such as the
scope of the emergency aid exception and how long the exception permits an officer to
remain in a residence in the particular circumstances of a case, are also not relevant to the
issue Clark raises on appeal.
As the district court ultimately concluded, Officer Crupper’s decision to open the
garage door in this case was justified by the community caretaking exception to the warrant
requirement. The district court identified the “first” 4 justification to this entry as being
centered around Officer Crupper’s reasonable belief that a resident of the house might be
in need of medical assistance. (R., pp.98-99.) This reasonable belief was based upon: (1)
the prior welfare check on the same residence conducted on May 2, which was initiated by
a report from a neighbor that a couple at Clark’s residence was arguing and that the male
was “breaking things”; (2) the second report from the neighbor on May 4 indicating loud
noises and crying from the female and toddler at Clark’s residence; (3) the presence of
clothes, jewelry and other personal property in the driveway which Officer Crupper
believed to have been “thrown”; (4) Officer Crupper’s training and experience involving
domestic violence; (5) Officer Crupper’s inability to contact any residents of the house

4

As a “second” justification for the officers’ entry, the district court discussed the
unsupervised toddler. (R., p.99.) As noted above, while the officers’ concerns for the
toddler are relevant to the question of whether the officers, once in the garage, possessed
lawful authority under the emergency aid exception of the warrant requirement to enter the
house itself, it is not relevant to the more limited issue Clark raises on appeal. However,
to the extent the district court erred by considering irrelevant facts in its analysis of whether
Officer Crupper lawfully opened the garage door, or erred by analyzing only the officers’
entry into the home itself and not the garage, this Court may still freely apply the law to
the issue raised on appeal; See Section B, supra (Standard of Review). Additionally, an
appellate court may affirm a district court order on any correct legal theory that was raised
to the district court. See, e.g., State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222
(1997); State v. Diaz, 158 Idaho 629, 636, 349 P.3d 1220, 1227 (Ct. App. 2015).
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despite knocking loudly for one to one and a half minutes, and despite the presence of a
vehicle in the driveway. (R., pp.93-99.) For the reasons set forth by the district court, the
cumulation of these factors justified Officer Crupper’s relatively limited intrusion of
opening the unlocked garage door.
On appeal, Clark asserts that the prior, May 2 welfare check upon his residence is
not relevant to the question of whether Officer Crupper was justified in opening the garage
door because the state failed to present evidence that Officer Crupper knew of this prior
contact at the time he opened the door. (Appellant’s brief, p.16.) It is true that Officer
Crupper did not testify to this effect at the hearing on the motion to suppress. However, in
his police report attached to Clark’s counsel’s affidavit submitted in support of Clark’s
motion to suppress, Officer Crupper indicated that he was aware of prior “calls in recent
days of a similar nature where domestic violence was suspected.” (R., p.41.) Likewise,
Officer Hemmert’s report (which was also attached to Clark’s counsel’s affidavit) stated
that Officer Crupper “attempted contact” with the residents of the house “[b]ecause of this
being a welfare check and the prior [May 2] disturbance.” (R., p.39.) While the police
reports were not specifically referenced at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district
court, in its memorandum decision and order, stated that it had considered the evidence
submitted as well as “the briefing submitted by the parties.” (R., p.93.) This consideration
of the briefing must also have included the attached police reports and supporting
affidavits, as the district court referenced the May 2 incident in both its factual recitation
and in its analysis of the officers’ entry in the residence. (R., pp.94, 96.) The state submits
that because Clark submitted the reports with his motion to suppress, and because the
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district court considered these reports in making its determination on Clark’s motion to
suppress, they are an appropriate part of this Court’s consideration.
If Clark entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to I.C.R. 11(a)(2) and
successfully preserved his appellate right to challenge the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress, Clark is still not entitled to relief because he has failed to demonstrate
that the district court erred.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Clark’s conviction and
sentence for heroin possession.
DATED this 14th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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